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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

5

SAN JOSE DIVISION

6
7

LINDA BRADLEY, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

8
9
10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12
13
14

Case No. 17-cv-07232-BLF

v.
T-MOBILE US, INC., et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS FOURTH AMENDED CLASS
AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
COMPLAINT
[Re: ECF 143, 165]

This is a case about employment discrimination in “the Cyber Age,” S. Dakota v. Wayfair,
Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2097 (2018). It has often been said that the Internet has wrought “farreaching systemic and structural changes in the economy.” Id. One of these changes is the ability

15
for companies like Facebook to collect enormous amounts of data about people through their
16
social media activity and online behavior more generally. These companies have harnessed that
17

information in many ways, including crafting so-called “targeted ads.” Targeted ads are

18
personalized to the user, featuring the products, services, and opportunities of greatest interest to
19
that user. In theory, both advertisers and users benefit: Advertisers can spend their marketing
20

dollars more efficiently, and users see more interesting content. In Plaintiffs’ view, however, this

21
kind of targeting can also be used in insidious ways—namely, to deny access to information to
22
certain groups of people and thereby advance discriminatory aims. Specifically, the plaintiffs in
23
24

this case believe that Defendants T-Mobile US, Inc. (“T-Mobile”) and Amazon.com, Inc.
(“Amazon”) routinely exclude older individuals from viewing the employment ads they post on

25
Facebook. In an effort to stop that practice, Plaintiffs have brought this putative class action
26
alleging violations of various federal and state laws.
27
28

Defendants move to dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint (“4AC”) on multiple grounds,
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1

including lack of Article III standing, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim

2

upon which relief may be granted. As set forth below, the Court holds that the 4AC does not

3

currently contain the allegations necessary to establish standing or personal jurisdiction, but that

4

Plaintiffs have adequately justified their narrow request for jurisdictional discovery. Accordingly,

5

the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss with LEAVE TO AMEND and GRANTS the request

6

for jurisdictional discovery.

7
8

United States District Court
Northern District of California

9

I.

BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn from the 4AC, which the Court must treat as true at the

pleading stage, Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011).
Defendants’ Alleged Conduct

10

A.

11

The defendants in this case are T-Mobile US, Inc. (“T-Mobile”) and Amazon.com, Inc.

12

(“Amazon”). These two major U.S. companies need little introduction. T-Mobile is one of the

13

largest wireless companies in the United States”; it provides “wireless communications services

14

including voice, messaging and data, to more than 71 million customers” and, as of December

15

2016, employs “approximately 50,000 full-time and part-time employees.” 4AC ¶ 39. Amazon is

16

“one of the largest online retailers in the world.” Id. ¶ 40. Headquartered in Seattle, Washington,

17

it “employed 341,400 full-time and part-time employees as of December 31, 2016.” Id.

18

This suit concerns Defendants’ methods of recruiting prospective employees, which

19

Plaintiffs believe discriminate against older workers. In particular, both Defendants allegedly use

20

Facebook’s ad platform to advertise employment opportunities at their various stores and

21

operations. 4AC ¶¶ 39-40. According to Plaintiffs, “Facebook has emerged as one of the largest

22

venues for employers to seek applicants for employment and for workers to find job

23

opportunities.” Id. ¶ 46. As “the most popular social media platform in the world,” id. ¶ 41,

24

Facebook collects a vast amount of information about its users, id. ¶ 44. Facebook then gives its

25

advertisers “the power to use that information to determine which Facebook users will be included

26

or excluded in the population that will receive their ads.” Id. Facebook promotes such targeted

27

advertising to employers as helping them to “minimize the cost of reaching people who are

28

interested in news jobs and maximize the number of people who respond to employment ads.” Id.
2
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1

¶ 45. Factors that advertisers can use to target ads include “age, gender, location, interests, and

2

behaviours.” Id.

3

Defendants are alleged to have used Facebook’s ad targeting functionality to recruit

4

younger workers and not older workers. They did this by imposing a “ceiling on the age of people

5

who will receive their job advertisements.” 4AC ¶ 82. Plaintiffs summarize the basic practice at

6

issue as follows:

7
8
9
10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12
13

When an employer or an employment agency creates, purchases, and
sends a Facebook ad to make workers aware of job opportunities and
encourage them to apply for various jobs, Facebook requires the
employers or employment agencies to select the population of
Facebook users who will be eligible to receive the ad, including the
age range of the users who will receive the ad. Following Facebook’s
encouragement to narrowly focus ad campaigns on the “right people,”
including by targeting younger people, upon information and belief,
Defendants have routinely focused their Facebook employment ads
on users who are under 40-years-old (and sometimes on users who
are under higher age thresholds). This prevents workers who are
above the selected age threshold from receiving employment ads and
pursuing relevant job opportunities.

14

Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiffs further allege that “[t]he default age setting for ads is 18 to 65+, which means

15

that anyone who is 18-years-old or older would receive the ad.” Id. ¶ 63. As a result, Plaintiffs

16

say, “any employer or employment agency that selects a narrower and younger age range (such as

17

ages 18 to 40) is consciously and purposefully choosing to target younger prospective applicants

18

and thereby excluding older applicants who will not receive the ad.” Id.

19

Defendants’ employment ads—and Facebook employment ads in general—are not

20

typically for individual job opportunities; rather, they “direct the Facebook user to [the

21

advertiser’s] ‘Careers’ or company Facebook pages, in addition to a page on the company’s

22

website page that has information about a range of job opportunities throughout the company.”

23

4AC ¶ 49. Thus, the prospective applicant can view “all available positions for which she or he

24

could apply and encourages prospective employees to apply for such positions.” Id.

25

Also relevant to this case is a function called “Why am I seeing this.” When a Facebook

26

user sees an ad, he or she can click on the “Why am I seeing this” function to view why he or she

27

has been selected to see that particular ad. 4AC ¶¶ 84-85. For instance, a user might see that “T-

28

Mobile wants to reach people ages 18 to 38 who live or were recently in the United States.” Id. ¶
3
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1
2
3

85. Thus, the user can view the age range that the advertiser selected.
The 4AC included the below exemplars of two age-restricted ads and the associated “Why
am I seeing this” pages:

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

4AC ¶¶ 2, 92. Other exemplars are attached the 4AC as Exhibit A. ECF 140-1.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have employed age-restricted ads on Facebook to
advertise “jobs that were located throughout the states where these employers employ workers,
including jobs in this District and elsewhere in California, the District of Columbia, and Ohio.”
4AC ¶ 97. Specifically, as to T-Mobile, the 4AC alleges that “T-Mobile advertised jobs in 42
states and the District of Columbia,” id. ¶ 39; as to Amazon, the 4AC alleges that Amazon
4

Case 5:17-cv-07232-BLF Document 169 Filed 03/13/20 Page 5 of 32

United States District Court
Northern District of California

1

advertised “for a range of positions . . . throughout the United States,” id. ¶ 40.

2

B.

3

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ use of age-restricted employment ads is part of a

The Instant Suit

4

“pattern or practice of age discrimination in employment advertising, recruitment, and hiring.”

5

4AC ¶¶ 89, 150. Accordingly, Plaintiffs filed this putative class action, alleging two basic legal

6

theories. First, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) makes it unlawful for an

7

employer “to print or public, or cause to be printed or published, any notice or advertisement

8

relating to employment by such employer . . . indicating any preference, limitation, specification,

9

or discrimination, based on age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(e). Plaintiffs believe that Defendants’

10

advertisements “indicate a preference” for younger workers and against older workers by (1) being

11

targeted to younger workers and excluded from older workers, and (2) informing users of the

12

targeting through the “Why am I seeing this” function. 4AC ¶¶ 12, 151; see Opp. at 18-19, 22.

13

Second, the ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or . . .

14

otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,

15

or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Plaintiffs

16

contend that Defendants’ age-restricted advertising constitutes disparate treatment in hiring

17

because it is disparate treatment in recruiting. See Opp. at 23. That is, employers only hire the

18

people who apply, who are the people they recruit; by favoring younger workers in recruitment,

19

Defendants necessarily favor them in hiring. Id.; see 4AC ¶¶ 166, 168.

20

Plaintiffs allege these theories under the ADEA and similar state laws. The operative 4AC

21

contains eleven counts: (1) discriminatory publication or advertising by an employer, in violation

22

of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(e); (2) disparate treatment in recruiting and hiring, in violation of

23

the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a); (3) discriminatory publication or advertising by an employer, in

24

violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“California FEHA”), Cal. Gov.

25

Code § 12940(d); (4) discriminatory publication or advertising, in violation of the District of

26

Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C. Code § 2-1402.11(a); (5) discriminatory

27

publication or advertising, in violation of the Ohio Fair Employment Practices Law (“OFEPL”),

28

Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(E)(4); (6) intentional discrimination in recruiting and hiring, in
5
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1

violation of the California FEHA, Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a); (7) intentional discrimination in

2

recruiting and hiring, in violation of the DCHRA, D.C. Code § 2-1402.11(a)(1); (8) intentional

3

discrimination in recruiting and hiring, in violation of the OFEPL, Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4112.02(A),

4

4112.14(A); (9) violation of the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51; (10)

5

violation of the California Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), Cal. Civ. Code § 51.5; (11)

6

violation of the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et

7

seq. Plaintiffs seek an injunction permanently enjoining Defendants from using age-restricted

8

employment ads, as well as the other forms of relief available under the above-listed statutes. See

9

4AC ¶ 3, p. 68.
The Plaintiffs in this case consist of the Communications Workers of America (“CWA”),

United States District Court
Northern District of California

10
11

four individual Named Plaintiffs, a “Plaintiff Class,” and a “Plaintiff Collective.” The CWA is

12

“an international labor union representing over 700,000 workers in a broad range of industries,

13

including telecommunications, cable, information technology, airline, manufacturing, print and

14

broadcast news media, education, public service, and healthcare.” 4AC ¶ 30. The four individual

15

Named Plaintiffs are: Linda Bradley, a 45-year-old woman living in Franklin County, Ohio, 4AC

16

¶ 31; Maurice Anscombe, a 57-year-old man living in Baltimore County, Maryland, id. ¶ 33; Lura

17

Callahan, a 67-year-old woman living in Franklin County, Ohio, id. ¶ 35; and Richard Hayne, a

18

61-year-old man living in Oakland, California, id. ¶ 37. All four Named Plaintiffs are proposed

19

representatives of a nationwide “Plaintiff Collective” of

20

All persons in the United States who from the earliest date actionable
under the limitations applicable to the given claim until the date of
judgment in this action (1) were 40 years old or older (2) used
Facebook during a time in which they were searching for
employment, and (3) were excluded from being eligible to receive an
employment-related advertisement or notice because one or more of
the Defendants placed an upper age limit on the population of
Facebook users that was eligible to receive an advertisement or
notice.

21
22
23
24
25

Id. ¶ 140.1 In addition, Haynie is the proposed representative of a smaller “Plaintiff Class” of
All persons who from the earliest date actionable under the limitations

26
27
28

1

The ADEA incorporates enforcement provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, including the
collective action provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). See 29 U.S.C. § 621.
6
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applicable to the given claim until the date of judgment in this action
(1) were 40 years old or older (2) used Facebook during a time in
which they were searching for employment and resided in California,
and (3) were excluded from being eligible to receive an employmentrelated advertisement or notice because one or more Defendants
placed an upper age limit on the population of Facebook users that
was eligible to receive an advertisement or notice.

1
2
3
4
Id. ¶ 121.
5

The counts in the 4AC are brought by various combinations of these Plaintiffs.
6
Specifically, the ADEA claims (Counts 1 and 2) are brought by the Named Plaintiffs and the
7
Plaintiff Collective; the California FEHA claims (Counts 3 and 6) are brought by Haynie and the
8
Plaintiff Class; the UCL and Unruh Act claims (Counts 10 and 11) are brought by Haynie, the
9
CWA, and the Plaintiff Class; and the remaining claims under D.C. and Ohio state law (Counts 4,
10
5, 7, 8, and 9) are brought by certain Named Plaintiffs in their individual capacities.

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12
13
14
15

Defendants now move to dismiss the 4AC on various grounds. ECF 143 (“Mot.”). This is
Defendants’ third motion to dismiss the operative complaint, but the first that has come before the
Court for a ruling. See ECF 73 (Motion to Dismiss the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”)), ECF
63 (Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)). The motion has been fully
briefed, ECF 147 (“Opp.”), ECF 155 (“Reply”), and the Court conducted a hearing on January 30,

16
2020, ECF 164.
17
18

II.

LEGAL STANDARDS
In the instant motion, Defendants raise three grounds for dismissing the various claims in

19
the 4AC: lack of subject matter jurisdiction, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1); lack
20
of personal jurisdiction, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2); and failure to state a
21
claim, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mot. at 4, 9, 15. Below, the Court reviews
22
the relevant legal standards for each type of motion.
23
24

C.

Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

A motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) tests whether the court has
25
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims alleged in the complaint. A Rule 12(b)(1) motion
26
may be either facial, where the inquiry is limited to the allegations in the complaint, or factual,
27
where the court may look beyond the complaint to consider extrinsic evidence. Wolfe v.
28
7

United States District Court
Northern District of California
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1

Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, Defendants lodge a facial attack on the

2

sufficiency of the allegations in the 4AC. See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035,

3

1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (in a facial attack under Rule 12(b)(1), “the challenger asserts that the

4

allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.”).

5

A district court “resolves a facial attack as it would a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6):

6

Accepting the plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's

7

favor, the court determines whether the allegations are sufficient as a legal matter to invoke the

8

court’s jurisdiction.” Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014). As with a Rule

9

12(b)(6) motion, however, a court is not required “to accept as true allegations that are merely

10

conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec.

11

Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008); see Thomas v. Mundell, 572 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir.

12

2009) (finding allegations “too vague” to support standing).

13

In the instant motion, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing, which “is

14

a necessary component of subject matter jurisdiction.” In re Palmdale Hills Prop., LLC, 654 F.3d

15

868, 873 (9th Cir. 2011). The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the “irreducible

16

constitutional minimum of standing” consists of three elements. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504

17

U.S. 555, 560 (1992). “The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly

18

traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a

19

favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). These

20

elements are often referred to as injury in fact, causation, and redressability. See, e.g., Planned

21

Parenthood of Greater Washington & N. Idaho v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 946 F.3d

22

1100, 1108 (9th Cir. 2020). Plaintiffs, as the parties invoking federal jurisdiction, bear the burden

23

of establishing the existence of Article III standing and, at the pleading stage, “must clearly allege

24

facts demonstrating each element.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (internal quotation marks and

25

citation omitted); see also Baker v. United States, 722 F.2d 517, 518 (9th Cir. 1983) (“The facts to

26

show standing must be clearly apparent on the face of the complaint.”).

27
28

“In a class action, this standing inquiry focuses on the class representatives.” NEI
Contracting & Eng’g, Inc. v. Hanson Aggregates Pac. Sw., Inc., 926 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir.
8
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1

2019). Standing for the putative class “is satisfied if at least one named plaintiff meets the

2

requirements.” Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007). But if none

3

of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class can establish standing to sue, the class

4

action cannot proceed. See NEI Contracting, 926 F.3d at 532 (citing O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.

5

488, 494 (1974)).

6
7

established before the Court may proceed to the merits. Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-

8

Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1950 (2019).

9
10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

Finally, the Court notes that standing, as a limit upon the power of a federal court, must be

D.

Rule 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) authorizes a defendant to seek dismissal of an

11

action for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). “In opposing a defendant's

12

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing

13

that jurisdiction is proper.” CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th

14

Cir. 2011). Courts may consider evidence presented in affidavits and declarations in determining

15

personal jurisdiction. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001). “Where, as here,

16

the defendant’s motion is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, the

17

plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to

18

dismiss.” Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and

19

citation omitted). “Uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as true, and factual

20

disputes are construed in the plaintiff’s favor,” Freestream Aircraft (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Aero Law

21

Grp., 905 F.3d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 2018), but a court is not “required to accept as true allegations

22

that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences,” In re

23

Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d at 1055.

24

In general, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction “if a rule or statute authorizes it to do

25

so and the exercise of such jurisdiction comports with the constitutional requirement of due

26

process.” Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2001). “When no federal

27

statute governs personal jurisdiction, the district court applies the law of the forum state.” Id.; see

28

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). “California’s long-arm statute allows the exercise of personal
9
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1

jurisdiction to the full extent permissible under the U.S. Constitution.” Daimler AG v. Bauman,

2

571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. § 410.10). Constitutional due process,

3

in turn, requires that a defendant “have certain minimum contacts” with the forum state “such that

4

the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”

5

Freestream Aircraft, 905 F.3d at 602 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316

6

(1945)).

United States District Court
Northern District of California

7

“The strength of contacts required depends on which of the two categories of personal

8

jurisdiction a litigant invokes: specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction.” Ranza, 793 F.3d at

9

1068 (citing Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 127). General jurisdiction exists when the defendant’s

10

contacts “are so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”

11

Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 127 (internal quotation marks omitted). Where a defendant is subject to

12

general jurisdiction, it may be sued “on any and all claims,” id. at 137, including claims “arising

13

from dealings entirely distinct” from its forum-related activities, id. at 127 (internal quotation

14

marks omitted). By contrast, specific jurisdiction is proper when the defendant’s contacts with the

15

forum state may be more limited but the plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to” those contacts.

16

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773,

17

1786 (2017). The Court discusses the requirements for specific jurisdiction in greater detail

18

below. See Part III.B.

19

E.

20

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include “a

Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

21

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint

22

that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

23

12(b)(6). In other words, “[a] motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

24

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted ‘tests the legal sufficiency of a

25

claim.’” Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting

26

Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a

27

complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell

28

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
10

United States District Court
Northern District of California
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1

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

2

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The

3

plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer

4

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

5

In evaluating the complaint, the court must “accept factual allegations in the complaint as

6

true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v.

7

St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). At the same time, a court

8

need not accept as true “allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice” or

9

“allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable

10

inferences.” In re Gilead, 536 F.3d at 1055 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

11

III.

12

DISCUSSION
Again, Defendants move to dismiss the 4AC on three grounds: lack of subject matter

13

jurisdiction, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1); lack of personal jurisdiction, under

14

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2); and failure to state a claim, under Federal Rule of Civil

15

Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court begins, as it must, with Defendants’ jurisdictional arguments under

16

Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2). Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999)

17

(“[J]urisdiction generally must precede merits in dispositional order.”). Finding them to be

18

meritorious, the Court must dismiss the 4AC without ruling on Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

19

However, because the Court grants leave to amend the 4AC, the Court also provides brief

20

guidance as to the substantive elements of Plaintiffs’ causes of actions.

21

A.

22

The Court begins with Defendants’ motion to dismiss the 4AC for lack of standing. As

Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing

23

noted above, Article III standing requires injury in fact, causation, and redressability. Defendants

24

first argue that the individual named plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of pleading these

25

elements, which precludes standing for the putative Plaintiff Class and Plaintiff Collective.

26

Defendants also raise several separate objections to CWA’s associational standing.

27
28

The Court separately addresses the parties’ arguments as to the individual named plaintiffs
and their arguments regarding CWA.
11
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i.

1

Individual Named Plaintiffs

To briefly review, there are four individual named plaintiffs in this case: Linda Bradley,
2
3

Maurice Anscombe, Lura Callahan, and Richard Haynie (collectively, the “Named Plaintiffs”).
Plaintiffs say they have suffered various injuries as a result of Defendants’ allegedly illegal

4
conduct, including: informational injury; the denial of jobs, and the lost wages incident thereto;
5
the denial of the opportunity to apply for jobs; and stigmatic injury. The Court holds that the
6
denial of the opportunity to apply for jobs, if properly alleged, would confer standing upon the
7
Named Plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the Court must grant the motion to dismiss because the
8
allegations in the 4AC are too vague and conclusory to establish that the Named Plaintiffs—rather
9
than unidentified members of the Plaintiff Class—personally experienced the complained-of
10
injuries.

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12
13
14
15
16

a. Standing, In General
The Supreme Court has written at length about Article III’s requirements of injury in fact,
causation, and redressability. An injury in fact is “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that
is (1) “concrete,” (2) “particularized,” and (3) “actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S., at 560). First, a “concrete”
injury is one that “actually exist[s]”; that is, it is “real” and not “abstract.” Id. Although both

17
tangible and intangible injuries may be concrete, id., the courts have sometimes struggled with
18
identifying when intangible harms are sufficiently concrete. Fortunately, that issue is not
19
20

presented here. Second, “[f]or an injury to be ‘particularized,’ it must affect the plaintiff in a
personal and individual way,” id.; the plaintiff must have a “direct stake in the controversy.”

21
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687
22
(1973). It is pursuant to this principle that the Supreme Court has rejected suits by litigants
23
24

asserting “generalized grievances about the conduct of government,” Hein v. Freedom From
Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 612 (2007), which are “undifferentiated and common to all

25
members of the public.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 575; see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S.
26
27

488, 494 (2009) (“[G]eneralized harm to the forest or the environment will not alone support
standing.”). Third, the requirement that an injury be “actual or imminent” “ensure[s] that the

28
12
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1

alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is certainly

2

impending.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013).

3

There must, moreover, be a sufficient “causal connection between the injury and the

4

conduct complained of.” United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743 (1995). Standing theories that

5

depend on a “speculative chain of possibilities”—such as those that turn on “the decisions of

6

independent actors”—lack the necessary causal connection. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414; see also

7

Yesler Terrace Cmty. Council v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 442, 447 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[W]hen standing

8

hinges on choices made by a third party, plaintiff must “adduce facts showing that those choices

9

have been or will be made in such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of

10

injury.”) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562). This causation requirement is closely linked to the

11

redressability requirement, i.e., that it be “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury

12

will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.

13

(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000).

14
15

b. Plaintiffs’ Alleged Injuries
Defendants contend that none of Plaintiffs’ four alleged injuries suffices under the above

16

standards. The Court first considers Plaintiffs’ contention that they experienced informational

17

injury. Opp. at 3. Plaintiffs argue that, in preventing them from seeing the Facebook ads,

18

Defendants “denied them information about jobs that the law requires them to receive on an equal

19

basis.” Id. Plaintiffs rely upon Havens Realty Corporation v. Coleman, in which the Supreme

20

Court held that black testers who had no intention of buying or renting a home nevertheless had

21

standing to enforce their statutory right “to truthful information concerning the availability of

22

housing,” because they had been injured by receiving false information. 455 U.S. 363, 374

23

(1982). The injury, in other words, was the tester’s “statutory right to truthful housing

24

information.” Id. at 375; see also Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 297 (7th

25

Cir. 2000) (following Havens). These so-called “tester” cases are inapposite, however, because

26

they involve litigants who sought and were then denied truthful information. The Plaintiffs in this

27

case did not seek employment information from Defendants. That distinction is important because

28

the Havens Court also rejected the proposition that all black people had standing: Plaintiff Willis
13
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1

lacked standing because he had not received false information and thus had not been injured. 455

2

U.S. at 375. The Court finds that the type of information injury in Havens is not present here.
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3

Second, Plaintiffs say they have “lost wages due to losing out on jobs ‘they would have

4

pursued and obtained’” had they seen the age-restricted ads. Opp. at 2 (quoting 4AC ¶ 247).

5

Defendants object that, though lost wages are undoubtedly concrete, this “supposed injury” rests

6

on a “highly attenuated chain of possibilities.” Reply at 7 (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410-12).

7

That is, Defendants believe redressability is lacking because Plaintiffs have not shown that they

8

would have applied for and received the jobs if they had seen the ads in question. The point is

9

well-taken. Accepting Plaintiffs’ allegation that they “would have pursued” some of the

10

advertised jobs, 4AC ¶¶ 32, 34, 36, 38, many factors may have affected whether Plaintiffs would

11

have then been hired. Hence, the Court agrees that the injury in cases like this one should not be

12

cast in terms of lost wages; instead, “the injury lies in the denial of an equal opportunity to

13

compete, not the denial of the job itself.” Shea v. Kerry, 796 F.3d 42, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2015). That

14

is, of course, Plaintiffs’ third alleged injury: the denial of the opportunity to apply for jobs because

15

of their age.

16

It is well-established that the denial of an opportunity to obtain a benefit is itself an injury

17

in fact. See, e.g., Robertson v. Allied Sols., LLC, 902 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Article III’s

18

strictures are met not only when a plaintiff complains of being deprived of some benefit, but also

19

when a plaintiff complains that she was deprived of a chance to obtain a benefit.”). Consider, for

20

example, challenges to race-based set aside programs—that is, programs requiring that a certain

21

percentage of government contracts go to minority-owned businesses. See, e.g., Northeastern Fla.

22

Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 660-61 (1993).

23

In such cases, the Supreme Court has said that “the injury in fact is the inability to compete on an

24

equal footing in the bidding process, not the loss of contract.” Id. at 667; see also Adarand

25

Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 211 (1995) (internal quotation marks and alterations

26

omitted) (“The injury in cases of this kind is that a discriminatory classification prevents the

27

plaintiff from competing on an equal footing.”).

28

That injury has also been recognized in cases challenging allegedly discriminatory criteria
14
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1

rather than strict quotas. For instance, in affirmative action cases, the Supreme Court has

2

identified the injury in fact as the denial of “the opportunity to compete for admission on an equal

3

basis.” Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 261–62 (2003); see also Regents of Univ. of California

4

v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 281 (1978) (finding Article III injury not in the “failure to be admitted”

5

but “in the University’s decision not to permit Bakke to compete for all 100 places in the class,

6

simply because of his race”). Other examples include programs for awarding public benefits to

7

individuals, e.g., Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 941 (9th Cir. 2003), or public funding to

8

entities, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 946 F.3d at 1108.
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9

And because the injury is the denial of the chance to seek the benefit, “the aggrieved party

10

need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but for the barrier in order to establish

11

standing.” Adarand, 515 U.S. at 211 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Planned

12

Parenthood, 946 F.3d at 1108 (explaining that a plaintiff “need not participate in the competition”

13

to suffer injury in fact, so long as it is “able and ready” to do so); Scott v. Pasadena Unified Sch.

14

Dist., 306 F.3d 646, 657 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The individual plaintiffs in the present action are not

15

required to demonstrate that but for the weighted lottery process they would obtain admission to

16

one of the voluntary schools.”). Redressability is satisfied in that removal of the barrier restores or

17

increases the litigant’s chances of obtaining the benefit.

18

These situations are closely analogous to the one at hand. The 4AC alleges that

19

Defendants imposed age restrictions on their Facebook ads that prevented the Named Plaintiffs

20

from seeing the ads and thereby learning about various job openings at Amazon and T-Mobile.

21

See, e.g., 4AC ¶¶ 32- 38. Because they did not become aware of these job openings, they were

22

unable to apply. After all, knowledge of the job openings is a prerequisite for Plaintiffs to apply

23

and compete for those jobs. Defendants’ allegedly discriminatory conduct—i.e., the age

24

restriction on the employment ads—constituted a barrier to Plaintiffs’ knowledge. The removal of

25

that barrier restores—indeed, it creates—Plaintiffs’ opportunity to compete for the advertised jobs,

26

thus redressing their injury.

27

It bears emphasizing that Plaintiffs’ theory is that they were literally prevented from

28

applying when they were prevented from learning about the positions. As a result, Plaintiffs need
15
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1

not show that they were “effectively deterred” from applying, Mot. at 11, or that applying “would

2

have been a futile gesture,” Mot. at 12. These standards arose to deal with factual situations that

3

are quite different from the one at hand. Courts use those standards to assure causation, separating

4

cases in which a plaintiff was “discouraged from applying” from those in which the plaintiff

5

“simply failed to do so.” Breiner v. Nevada Dep’t of Corr., 610 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2010);

6

see Hailes v. United Air Lines, 464 F.2d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir. 1972). If a plaintiff “simply failed”

7

to apply, that failure could not be attributed to the defendant’s actions. But there is no question of

8

causation where, as here, Plaintiffs allege that it was not within their power to apply because they

9

were unaware of the jobs.

United States District Court
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10

In other words, just as the plaintiffs in Northeastern Florida were purportedly denied an

11

opportunity to bid on certain contracts, the named plaintiffs in this case were denied an

12

opportunity to apply for certain jobs. The Court therefore finds that Article III standing could

13

properly be grounded in the denial of Plaintiffs’ opportunity to apply for jobs, though not in the

14

denial of the jobs themselves.

15

Nevertheless, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged

16

that they personally have experienced such injuries. Time and again courts have emphasized that

17

“[t]he existence of a racial or gender barrier is not enough to establish standing, without a

18

plaintiff’s showing that she has been . . . subjected to such a barrier.” Braunstein v. Arizona Dep’t

19

of Transp., 683 F.3d 1177, 1185 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Scott, 306 F.3d at 657). Members of the

20

disfavored group do not automatically have a “direct stake in the controversy,” SCRAP, 412 U.S.

21

at 687; they are merely “concerned bystanders” unless they personally experience the

22

discriminatory conduct. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755-56 (1984), abrogated on other

23

grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014). This

24

principle applies with equal force in cases of age-based discrimination. Moreover, in class

25

actions, “named plaintiffs who represent a class must allege and show that they personally have

26

been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to

27

which they belong and which they purport to represent.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357

28

(1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
16
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1

Here, that means that the Named Plaintiffs must show that they were deprived of the

2

opportunity to apply for jobs. To do so, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege that they were “able and

3

ready” to apply for one or more of the jobs advertised using age-restricted ads. See, e.g., Planned

4

Parenthood, 946 F.3d at 1108 (“It is a plaintiff’s ability and readiness to bid that ensures an

5

injury-in-fact is concrete and particular.”); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 261–62 (plaintiff had standing to

6

challenge university’s race-conscious transfer admissions policy, even though he never applied as

7

a transfer student, because he demonstrated that he was “able and ready” to do so); see generally

8

Breiner, 610 F.3d at 1206 (“[A] nonapplicant suffers an invasion of a legally protected interest . . .

9

if he would have applied for the job had it not been for the employer’s discriminatory practices.”).

10

In this context, to be “able” means qualified and to be “ready” means seeking employment and

11

genuinely interested in the position. Cf. Bates, 511 F.3d at 988 (Habib had standing to challenge

12

hearing standard because there was no other qualification standard “that prevented him from

13

applying for the job”); Wilson v. Glenwood Intermountain Properties, Inc., 98 F.3d 590, 596 (10th

14

Cir. 1996) (“Persons who merely see a discriminatory advertisement” but are not interested in the

15

advertised housing or lack qualifications are no more than “concerned bystanders.”).

16

Plaintiffs maintain that the 4AC contains the necessary allegations to show each of the

17

Named Plaintiffs have been denied the opportunity to apply for jobs with Defendants. Opp. at 5.

18

The 4AC alleges that each of the Named Plaintiffs were “qualified to perform one or more jobs at

19

each of the Defendants that was offered during the time period at issue” and that they would have

20

“pursued” those “specific job opportunities.” See 4AC ¶¶ 31-38. The 4AC further alleges that the

21

Facebook ads for these jobs were subject to age restrictions and that, as a result, the Named

22

Plaintiffs did not receive the ads and did not learn about the jobs. Id. Importantly, however, the

23

4AC does not identify—even by way of example—a single job for which these allegations are

24

true. That is a fatal failing. The Third Circuit’s decision in Newark Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town

25

of Harrison, N.J. is instructive on this point. 907 F.2d 1408 (3d Cir. 1990). There, the court held

26

that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge Harrison, New Jersey’s residency requirement for

27

municipal jobs as having a disparate impact on blacks. Id. at 1409, 1412, 1416. The court

28

explained: “The fact that Harrison may have been utilizing employment practices which had a
17
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1

discriminatory impact on blacks does not, in and of itself, mean . . . that every black who may

2

have been generally interested in jobs similar to those offered by Harrison during this period were

3

thereby injured by those practices.” Id. at 1416.

4

So too here. To establish personalized injury, the Named Plaintiffs must show they were

5

qualified for and interested in the particular jobs subject to Defendants’ allegedly discriminatory

6

practices. Those jobs could either be advertised on the face of the Facebook ad or be posted on a

7

website—such as a Defendant’s Careers page—to which the ad linked. Yet, the 4AC alleges

8

generally that T-Mobile and Amazon advertised “for a range of positions,” 4AC ¶¶ 39-40, without

9

providing any description or examples of these positions to suggest that the Named Plaintiffs

10

would have been able and ready to apply for them. The broad allegation that “one or more” such

11

positions exist as to each Named Plaintiff is, by itself, merely conclusory. And although the 4AC

12

suggests certain job titles for which each Named Plaintiff would be qualified, see, e.g., id. ¶ 37

13

(“Mr. Haynie would be qualified for a range of positions at T-Mobile, including but not limited to

14

Technology Innovation Designer Videographer”), the 4AC does not allege that there were open

15

positions for those job titles during the relevant time period—much less that those positions were

16

advertised using age-restricted ads. To be sure, there are likely to be members of the Plaintiff

17

Class that were prevented from seeing ads for jobs to which they were able and ready to apply,

18

and thus were deprived of the opportunity to so apply. But under the allegations in the 4AC, the

19

Named Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they themselves experienced that deprivation.

20

Plaintiffs’ fourth alleged injury—stigmatic injury—fails for the same reason. Stigmatic

21

injury—i.e., “stigmatizing members of the disfavored group as innately inferior and therefore as

22

less worthy”—certainly may confer Article III standing in discrimination cases. Heckler v.

23

Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739 (1984). Nonetheless, not every member of the disfavored group is

24

stigmatized for standing purposes by virtue of discriminatory conduct. Allen, 468 U.S. 755-56.

25

As the Supreme Court has said, stigmatic injury “accords a basis for standing only to those

26

persons who are personally denied equal treatment by the challenged discriminatory conduct.” Id.

27

at 755. Having failed to show that the Named Plaintiffs were denied the opportunity to apply for

28

jobs in which they were interested and for which they were qualified, Plaintiffs also have not
18
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1

shown that they were stigmatized by that denial. At most, Plaintiffs have pleaded that they are

2

members of the disfavored group—older workers. Plaintiffs can only establish stigmatic injury to

3

the extent they can establish the denial of the opportunity to apply; the two theories of injury rise

4

and (in this case) fall together.

5

In sum, to have Article III standing, the Named Plaintiffs must show that (1) there were

6

jobs for which they were qualified and (2) in which they were genuinely interested that (3) the

7

Defendants advertised using age-restricted Facebook ads and (4) about which the Named Plaintiffs

8

never learned. They have not done so, and therefore lack standing to bring this suit.

United States District Court
Northern District of California

9

ii.

Associational Standing of CWA

10

The Court now turns to the standing of CWA, which is a plaintiff for various claims in the

11

4AC. An association may have standing in either of two ways: (1) first-party standing, on its own

12

behalf, see, e.g., Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 904 (9th Cir. 2002), or (2) third-

13

party standing, on behalf its members, see, e.g., Am. Diabetes Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of the

14

Army, 938 F.3d 1147, 1155 (9th Cir. 2019). CWA asserts only the latter, Opp. at 7, which

15

requires a showing that “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right;

16

(b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purposes; and (c) neither the

17

claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the

18

lawsuit.” Id.

19

Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that CWA’s members would have standing

20

to sue in their own right. To meet this requirement, Plaintiffs need only show that one of CWA’s

21

members has standing. See Carrico v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th

22

Cir. 2011). Here, Plaintiffs offer the three Named Plaintiffs who are also members of CWA:

23

Bradley, Anscombe, and Callahan. See 4AC ¶¶ 31, 33, 35. However, the Court’s above

24

determination that their standing has not been adequately alleged also means that these Named

25

Plaintiffs cannot establish CWA’s standing.

26

At the hearing, Plaintiffs also pointed to its broad allegation that “[n]umerous members of

27

CWA who are also members of the proposed Class reside in this District and elsewhere in

28

California, and they have been denied advertisements about jobs at Amazon and T-Mobile within
19
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1

the State of California concerning jobs in this District.” 4AC ¶ 30. Plaintiffs believe this

2

allegation suffices because “[i]n this Circuit, organizational plaintiffs need not ‘specifically

3

identif[y] a member of the organization to establish standing for the organization.’” ECF 164

4

(“Tr.”) at 24; see ECF 91 at 44 (quoting Nat’l Council of La Raza v. Cegavske, 800 F.3d 1032,

5

1041 (9th Cir. 2015)). Plaintiffs are incorrect. The cited case refers to the pleading standard for

6

first-party standing, not third-party standing on behalf of an organization’s members. An

7

organization has first-party standing if it can show “(1) frustration of its organizational mission;

8

and (2) diversion of its resources to combat the particular conduct at issue,” Am. Diabetes Ass’n,

9

938 F.3d at 1154, and it is unsurprising that identification of individual members is unnecessary to

10

do make that showing. By contrast, the Supreme Court has required “individual affidavits” from

11

members in order for an organization to plausibly allege third-party standing. Summers, 555 U.S.

12

at 499 (“Without individual affidavits, how is the court to assure itself that the Sierra Club, for

13

example, has ‘thousands of members’ who ‘use and enjoy the Sequoia National Forest’?”).

14

“While it is certainly possible—perhaps even likely—that one individual will” be able to establish

15

standing to sue, “that speculation does not suffice.” Id. Hence, Plaintiffs have not made a

16

sufficient showing that CWA’s members would have standing to sue in their own right.

17

Defendants also oppose CWA’s standing on the basis of the third prong—that “neither the

18

claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the

19

lawsuit.” Mot. at 14. Unlike the first two, this prong is not mandated by Article III; it is “merely

20

prudential,” “designed to promote efficiency in adjudication.” Cent. Delta Water Agency v.

21

United States, 306 F.3d 938, 951 n.9 (9th Cir. 2002). More to the point, it is not typically

22

implicated where, as here, the organization does not seek damages on behalf of its members, see

23

Opp. at 7 (“CWA does not seek (and waives any right to) monetary damages.”). See, e.g., Alaska

24

Fish & Wildlife Fed’n & Outdoor Council, Inc. v. Dunkle, 829 F.2d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 1987)

25

(“[B]ecause the Fund seeks declaratory and prospective relief rather than money damages, its

26

members need not participate directly in the litigation.”); United Food & Commercial Workers

27

Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 546 (1996) (affirming prior holding that

28

“individual participation is not normally necessary when an association seeks prospective or
20
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1

injunctive relief for its members”). In this case, the Court does not see any special need for the

2

individual participation of CWA’s members. “Although the participation of some individual

3

plaintiffs may be needed to present the case for injunctive relief, it is highly unlikely that the

4

participation of each injured plaintiff will be required.” Asociacion De Productores v. California

5

Avocado Comm’n, No. SACV08570JVSFFMX, 2009 WL 10698881, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2,

6

2009). The Court therefore rejects Defendants’ contention that “individualized proof” is necessary

7

and precludes CWA’s associational standing.

8

Finally, the parties do not dispute that the interests CWA seeks to protect are germane to

9

its purpose. See Mot. at 14; Reply at 10. Accordingly, the only barrier to CWA’s standing is its

10

ability to adequately plead the standing of at least one member.
***
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11
12
13

Because neither the individual Named Plaintiffs nor CWA has standing to bring this suit,
the Court must GRANT the motion to dismiss the 4AC for lack of Article III standing.

14

B.

15

Defendants also move to dismiss the 4AC for lack of personal jurisdiction. Mot. at 5-9. It

16

is well-established that, without jurisdiction, a court is “powerless to proceed to an adjudication.”

17

Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584. The Plaintiffs’ failure to establish Article III standing means that the

18

Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. It is equally clear, however, that “[j]urisdiction is

19

vital only if the court proposes to issue a judgment on the merits.” Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia

20

Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007). “Personal jurisdiction, too, is an essential element

21

of the jurisdiction of a district court.” Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584 (internal quotation marks and

22

alterations omitted). Accordingly, and to aid Plaintiffs’ likely amendment of its complaint, the

23

Court now recognizes that the Court’s lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendants is another

24

jurisdictional barrier to Plaintiffs’ suit.

25

Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

At the outset, the Court confirms that “Defendants have not waived their personal

26

jurisdiction defense.” Mot. at 9. The 4AC alleges that Facebook’s Terms of Service contain a

27

choice of venue provision requiring its users “to resolve any disputes related to their use of

28

Facebook in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California or a state court located
21
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1

in San Mateo County” and to “submit to the personal jurisdiction of such courts.” 4AC ¶ 27. The

2

4AC alleges that Defendants agreed to these Terms of Service and have thus “consented to

3

personal jurisdiction and venue in this Court and have waived any argument that exercising

4

personal jurisdiction over them with respect to their discriminatory advertising on Facebook is

5

improper, unlawful, or unconstitutional.” Id. In response, Defendants have submitted a copy of

6

the Terms of Service, ECF 143-2, which are incorporated by reference into the 4AC and thus may

7

be considered on a motion to dismiss. See Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir.

8

2007) (affirming that “a court may consider a writing referenced in a complaint but not explicitly

9

incorporated therein if the complaint relies on the document and its authenticity is unquestioned”).

10

The full venue provision contained therein states that it applies to disputes “against us”—i.e.,

11

Facebook. As Facebook is not a party to the instant action, the Court agrees with Defendants that

12

the venue provision does not apply here. Meanwhile, Plaintiffs’ briefing does not challenge the

13

accuracy of Defendants’ copy of the Terms of Service or otherwise advance the waiver allegation

14

made in the 4AC. The Court therefore finds that Defendants have not waived their personal

15

jurisdiction challenge.
With regard to that challenge, Defendants contend that their contacts with California are

16
17

insufficient to justify either general or specific jurisdiction. In response, Plaintiffs assert that this

18

Court has specific jurisdiction over the claims for which Haynie and/or the CWA are plaintiffs.

19

See Opp. at 7-8. They concede that the Court would not have specific jurisdiction over the claims

20

brought by Bradley, Anscombe, and Callahan in their individual capacities. Tr. at 22. Plaintiffs

21

therefore ask the Court to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over them instead. See id.; Opp.

22

at 14.

23

iii.

Specific Jurisdiction

The Court begins with specific jurisdiction, which Plaintiffs assert as to the claims brought

24
25

by Haynie and the CWA—i.e., the claims under the ADEA and California law.2 The Ninth

26

Circuit has set forth a three-prong test for whether a defendant has the “minimum contacts”

27
28

2

Counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 10, 11.
22
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5

necessary for specific jurisdiction:
(1) the defendant must either “purposefully direct his activities”
toward the forum or “purposefully avail himself of the privileges of
conducting activities in the forum”;
(2) “the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the
defendant’s forum-related activities”; and
(3) “the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and
substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.”

6

Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Dole

7

Food Co., Inc. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002)). “The plaintiff bears the burden of

8

satisfying the first two prongs of the test.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d

9

797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004). If the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing as to those first two prongs,

10

“the burden then shifts to the defendant to ‘present a compelling case’ that the exercise of

11

jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.

12

462, 477 (1985)).

13
14
15

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not satisfied their burden of establishing the first and
second prongs, and the Court agrees.
The first prong of the specific jurisdiction test is met if the defendant “purposefully

16

directed” his activities toward the forum or “purposefully availed” himself of “the privileges of

17

conducting activities in the forum.” The Ninth Circuit has said that “purposeful availment” and

18

“purposeful direction” are “two distinct concepts.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. The former

19

applies to claims sounding in contract whereas the latter applies to claims sounding in tort. Picot

20

v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2015). Because Plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination are

21

“more akin to tort claims,” the Court employs the purposeful direction framework. Ziegler v.

22

Indian River Cty., 64 F.3d 470, 474 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing with approval an ADEA case in which

23

the district court applied the tort-case standard); see Opp. at 9.

24

Purposeful direction, in turn, can be shown in two ways. First, the Ninth Circuit has said

25

that “the commission of an intentional tort in a state is a purposeful act that will satisfy” the

26

purposeful direction test. Freestream Aircraft, 905 F.3d at 603. In other words, if the “allegedly

27

intentional tortious conduct” occurred in the forum state, that conduct has plainly been

28

purposefully directed at the forum state. Id. Alternatively, if the defendant’s conduct “takes place
23
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1

outside the forum,” there may still be purposeful direction if that conduct “has effects inside the

2

forum state.” Id. at 604. This second method of showing purposeful direction is known as the

3

“effects” test from Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d at 1069.
Plaintiffs advance both theories of purposeful direction, arguing (1) that “Defendants’

4
5

discriminatory conduct occurred in California,” Opp. at 8, and (2) that Defendants “directed their

6

biased advertising and recruiting activities to California,” Opp. at 10. The Court considers each in

7

turn.

8
9
10
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11

As to the first theory, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ acts of discrimination occurred in
California because “the ads were created in California and published to California residents.”
Opp. at 9. Specifically, Plaintiffs point to allegations that Defendants:
•

Facebook’s ad platform that is located in this District,” 4AC ¶ 22;

12
13

•

“[I]nteracted with Facebook’s employees who are located in this District to create,
purchase, and publish” the ads, id.; and

14
15

“[I]ntentionally created and purchased discriminatory ads in this District via

•

“[U]sed Facebook’s delivery algorithm in California,” Opp. at 9 (citing 4AC ¶ 83).

16

According to Plaintiffs, these allegations show that Defendants’ tortious activity occurred in

17

California because “the Ninth Circuit has held that violations of employment discrimination laws

18

occur both were unlawful decisions are made and where those decisions are implemented.” Opp.

19

at 9 (citing Passantino v. J&J Consumer Prods., 212 F.3d 493, 504-05 (9th Cir. 2000)).

20

Where, as here, Defendants are alleged to have violated the anti-discrimination laws

21

through online activity, the question of where the tortious activity “occurred” is a somewhat

22

metaphysical one. Passantino—upon which Plaintiffs rely—does not provide an answer. As

23

Defendants correctly point out, Passsantino concerned the proper construction of Title VII’s

24

venue provision, not the minimum contacts analysis of personal jurisdiction. Reply at 3; see 212

25

F.3d at 504-06. Nor is the Court aware of any other case supporting Plaintiffs’ view. For

26

instance, Freestream Aircraft—which clarified the Ninth Circuit’s jurisprudence in this area—

27

involved more straightforward facts. There, the defendant had “committed the intentional tort of

28

defamation while present in the forum state”: He spoke the allegedly defamatory oral statements
24
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1

while physically present in Nevada. Id. at 601-03. Here, by contrast, it is not alleged that any of

2

Defendants’ actions was carried out through employees located in California, or that Defendants

3

were otherwise present in the forum state when they “created and purchased” the ads, “interacted”

4

with Facebook, or “used” the algorithm.
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5

The Court is also mindful of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent admonition that the

6

minimum contacts analysis focuses upon “contacts that the defendant himself creates with the

7

forum State” and not the contacts of a third party with whom the defendant is associated. Walden

8

v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014) (emphasis in original). That Facebook’s ad platform and

9

Facebook employees are allegedly located in this District goes to Facebook’s contacts with

10

California, not Defendants’. Stripping away Facebook’s conduct, the Court sees no allegations of

11

conduct by Defendants’ themselves that occurred in California. The Court is therefore skeptical

12

that, based on Plaintiffs’ allegations, it can fairly be said that Defendants’ allegedly tortious

13

conduct “occurred” in California.

14

Nor is the Court persuaded that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged their theory under the

15

Calder effects test. The Calder effects test requires that the defendant have “(1) committed an

16

intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows

17

is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d at 1069 (internal quotation

18

marks and citation omitted). Beginning with the first element, the Ninth Circuit has explained that

19

the “intentional act” requirement means an “actual, physical act in the real world”; it does not

20

require “an intent to accomplish a result or consequence of that act.” Brayton Purcell LLP v.

21

Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation

22

omitted). The parties seem to agree that Defendants are alleged to have committed several

23

“intentional acts,” including: creating and purchasing Facebook ads that solicited workers to apply

24

for jobs, directing those ads to Facebook users located in California and throughout the United

25

States, and excluding older workers from receiving the ads. 4AC ¶¶ 22-24. The question becomes

26

whether these acts were “expressly aimed” at California, as required to satisfy the second element

27

of the Calder effects test. Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d at 1069.

28

Courts have “struggled with the question whether tortious conduct on a nationally
25
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1

accessible website is expressly aimed at any, or all, of the forums in which the website can be

2

viewed.” Mavrix Photo, Inc., 647 F.3d at 1229. As relevant here, though, most courts have

3

concluded that a nationwide advertising campaign is not “expressly aimed” to each state in which

4

the advertisement appears. See, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. V. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418-19 (9th

5

Cir. 1997); Surface Supplied Inc. v. Kirby Morgan Dive Sys., Inc., No. C 13-575 MMC, 2013 WL

6

2355446, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2013) (“Advertising in national publications or on Facebook

7

and Twitter, however, is not sufficient to support a finding of purposeful availment.”); JibJab

8

Media Inc. v. White Castle Mgmt., No. CV1204178MMMJEMX, 2013 WL 12123696, at *6 (C.D.

9

Cal. May 14, 2013) (“The fact that a defendant does not prevent its online content from reaching

10

residents of the forum state does not, however, demonstrate that it purposefully directed its online

11

activities towards any individual residing forum state.”); see also Cascade Corp. v. Hiab–Foco

12

AB, 619 F.2d 36, 37–38 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding no specific jurisdiction where defendant

13

advertised in “national publications” circulated in forum, visited forum on two occasions, and

14

mailed accusatory letters to plaintiff in forum); but see In re Oreck Corp. Halo Vacuum & Air

15

Purifiers Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. ML 12-2317 CAS JEMX, 2012 WL 6062047, at *8

16

(C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012). There must be “something more” to demonstrate that the defendant

17

directed his activity toward the forum state. Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 418.

18

In Mavrix—the case upon which Plaintiffs principally rely—that “something more” was

19

found in the subject matter of the website, which had a “specific focus on the California-centered

20

celebrity and entertainment industries.” 647 F.3d at 1230. But here, unlike in Mavrix, the content

21

of the advertisements did not specifically target California residents or focus on jobs available in

22

California. Accord DFSB Kollective Co. v. Bourne, 897 F. Supp. 2d 871, 882 (N.D. Cal. 2012)

23

(“Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that any of the advertisements on Defendant’s Websites targeted

24

Californians.”). Although Plaintiffs allege that “Amazon and T-Mobile each sent at least hundreds

25

of thousands of age-restricted advertisements to Facebook users throughout the United States,

26

including users in California and in this District,” 4AC ¶ 25, and that Defendants “advertised

27

thousands of jobs that are located in California,” id. ¶ 24, these allegations are unsupported and

28

conclusory. Plaintiffs do not cite any examples of age-restricted ads sent to Californians or
26
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1

advertising job openings located in California, or otherwise explain the factual basis for their

2

allegations. The only examples Plaintiffs do cite are three ads that were not subject to the

3

challenged age restriction; they were visible to all “people ages 18 and older.” ECF 154-2. In the

4

Court’s view, these ads cannot support an inference that Defendants sent age-restricted ads to

5

Californians. They do support an inference that Defendants used non-age-restricted ads in

6

California, but it cannot be said that Plaintiffs’ claims “arise out of” non-age-restricted ads.

7

All told, Plaintiffs’ allegations appear to be based on nothing more than the fact that

8

California is part of the United States and the lack of any evidence that Defendants exempted

9

California from their nationwide campaign. That is simply not enough to establish that

10

Defendants’ “expressly aimed” the challenged advertisements at California. As a result, Plaintiffs

11

have not adequately pleaded specific jurisdiction.

12

iv.

Pendent Personal Jurisdiction

As to the claims brought by Bradley, Anscombe, and Callahan in their individual

13
14

capacities under Ohio and D.C. law3, Plaintiffs ask the Court to exercise pendent personal

15

jurisdiction. The doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction—which has been adopted by the Ninth

16

Circuit—permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over “a claim for which there is no

17

independent basis of personal jurisdiction so long as it arises out of a common nucleus of

18

operative facts with a claim in the same suit over which the court does have personal jurisdiction.”

19

CE Distribution, LLC v. New Sensor Corp., 380 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 2004). It is a

20

discretionary doctrine. Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1180

21

(9th Cir. 2004). That is, even if a claim “arises out of a common nucleus of operative facts” as a

22

claim over which a district court has personal jurisdiction, the court may “dismiss the pendent

23

claims where considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants so dictate.”

24

Id. at 1181.
Of course, in this case, there are no claims over which the Court properly has personal

25
26

jurisdiction, for the Court has dismissed the claims of Haynie and the CWA. As a result, the Court

27
28

3

Counts 4, 5, 7, and 8.
27
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1

necessarily lacks personal jurisdiction over Bradley’s, Anscombe’s, and Callahan’s claims. The

2

Court need not consider whether it could or should exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over

3

these claims if the Court did have jurisdiction over the claims of Haynie and the CWA. Those

4

issues—which Defendants did not address in their briefing—will be left to another day.

5

C.

6

Having found that the 4AC must be dismissed, the Court now considers whether to permit

7
8
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9

Leave to Amend and Jurisdictional Discovery

leave to amend and whether to grant jurisdictional discovery.
v.

Leave to Amend

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a), leave to amend “shall be freely given

10

when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying purpose of Rule 15 to facilitate

11

decisions on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

12

1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).

13

Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has instructed district courts to grant leave to amend unless one or

14

more of the following factors is present: (1) undue delay, (2) bad faith or dilatory motive, (3)

15

repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment, (4) undue prejudice to the opposing party, and

16

(5) futility of amendment. See Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th

17

Cir. 2003) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).

18

Defendants oppose leave to amend, arguing that Plaintiffs have already amended their

19

pleadings four times, and one of those amendments was after a hearing on Defendants’ Motion to

20

Dismiss the TAC. Defendants also point out that this case has been pending for over two years,

21

yet it remains at the pleading stage. See ECF 1 (Complaint filed December 2017). These are

22

compelling concerns, no doubt. On the other hand, this is the Court’s first order assessing the

23

sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ pleading. See United States v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d

24

1161, 1183 (9th Cir. 2016) (reversing denial of leave to amend even though the plaintiff had

25

previously amended his pleading three times). Moreover, “delay alone is not sufficient to justify

26

the denial of . . . leave to amend,” DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir.

27

1987), and Defendants have not articulated any specific prejudice beyond the burden of continuing

28

to defend this litigation. The Court therefore concludes that leave to amend is appropriate.
28
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1

vi.

Jurisdictional Discovery

The Court also finds that Plaintiffs have justified their need for jurisdictional discovery and
2
proffered a sufficiently narrow request. See ECF 165, 168. As discussed above, in order to justify
3

this Court’s personal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege that Defendants sent age-

4
restricted ads to California residents. Similarly, in order to establish their Article III standing, the
5
Named Plaintiffs must plausibly allege the existence of at least some specific jobs for which they
6
would have applied, but for the age restriction. That is so even though the basis of their suit is that
7
they never saw the challenged advertisements; they are not relieved of the requirement of showing
8
they personally experienced injury in fact. At the same time, the Court recognizes the difficulty of
9
identifying advertisements that the entire Plaintiff Class was allegedly prevented from seeing;
10
such information is not within Plaintiffs’ possession and is difficult to obtain. Thus, jurisdictional
11
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discovery will be helpful—if not necessary—to establish the jurisdictional facts identified in this
12
order. And although the 4AC has various deficiencies, the factual allegations contained therein
13
14

are sufficiently specific and confined that jurisdictional discovery will not be a “fishing
expedition,” Reply at 6.

15
Accordingly, the Court will GRANT the request for jurisdictional discovery, as narrowed
16
17

by Plaintiffs’ Letter at ECF 168 to exclude ads that were not age-restricted. The Court agrees with
Defendants that non-age-restricted ads—while potentially relevant to the merits of Plaintiffs’

18
claims—are not necessary to ascertain the jurisdictional facts, see ECF 166. The Court is satisfied
19

that Plaintiffs’ narrowed request is not overbroad and will not unduly burden Defendants.

20
21

vii.

Other Deficiencies in the Complaint

As usual, leave to amend is restricted to the defects discussed in this order and in
22

Defendants’ motion; Plaintiffs may not add new parties or claims without obtaining prior express

23
leave of the Court. However, the Court emphasizes that Plaintiffs are encouraged to address any
24
25

issues raised in Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state claim, even though the Court
lacks jurisdiction to formally adjudicate that motion. In light of Plaintiffs’ multiple prior

26
amendments and the years this case has been pending, the Court will be reluctant to allow
27
additional opportunities for amendment. Hence, in the interest of efficiency and to guide Plaintiffs
28
29
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1

in making their amendments, the Court weighs in briefly on two of Defendants’ arguments

2

regarding the substantive sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ claims.
First, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs cannot make out a disparate treatment claim under

United States District Court
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3
4

the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (Count 2). See Mot. at 22-25. Section 623(a)(1) 4 makes it

5

unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because of such

6

individual’s age.” Although disparate treatment claims may also be based on “ad hoc, informal”

7

discrimination, Plaintiffs allege a “formal, facially discriminatory policy,” Hazen Paper Co. v.

8

Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993), namely: a practice of expressly excluding workers from being

9

recruited based upon their age, see Opp. at 23.

10

The Supreme Court has stated in no uncertain terms that, “to establish a disparate-

11

treatment claim under the plain language of the ADEA, . . . a plaintiff must prove that age was the

12

‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse decision.” Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167,

13

176 (2009). That is, the ADEA does not permit “a mixed-motives age discrimination claim.” Id.

14

at 175. As the Supreme Court has further explained, “[a]n act or omission is not regarded as a

15

cause of an event if the particular event would have occurred without it.” Id. at 177. Defendants

16

argue that Plaintiffs have not stated a disparate treatment claim because they cannot allege that

17

“they would have been hired but for their age.” Mot. at 23. This objection appears to have merit.

18

Plaintiffs respond that a plaintiff in an ADEA case is not required to plead the McDonnell

19

Douglas factors for a prima facie case. Opp. at 23 (citing Sheppard v. David Evans & Assoc., 694

20

F.3d 1045, 1050 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012)). True enough. The reason is that McDonnell Douglas is a

21

burden-shifting framework used in cases where direct evidence in unavailable. Swierkiewicz v.

22

Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002). The McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the

23

plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination,” including where a policy is “discriminatory

24

on its face.” Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985). In other words,

25
26
27
28

4

At the hearing, Plaintiffs confirmed that they are bringing only a disparate treatment claim and
not a disparate impact claim. Tr. at 37-38. Plaintiffs believe that 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2)—which
has been held to be authorize disparate impact claims, see Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544
U.S. 228, 232 (2005)—also bars disparate treatment. Whether that is true, however, is beyond the
scope of this order, as 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) indisputably provides for disparate treatment liability.
30
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1

Plaintiffs may ultimately prove by either direct or circumstantial evidence that age was the “but-

2

for” cause of the challenged employer decision. Gross, 557 U.S. at 177. But that does not

3

absolve Plaintiffs of pleading but-for causation, which is a necessary element of a disparate

4

treatment claim.
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5

As it currently stands, the 4AC does not appear to allege that Plaintiffs would have been

6

hired but for the discriminatory advertising practice. Remember, hiring is the challenged

7

employment decision under § 623(a). It is true, as Plaintiffs emphasize, that they have alleged an

8

advertising policy that is “discriminatory on its face.” Opp. at 23. But they have not alleged a

9

facially discriminatory hiring policy. The Court accepts Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants’

10

advertising practices “cause[] a larger number of younger workers to apply for the jobs,” which

11

may then lead a larger number of younger workers to ultimately be hired. See Opp. at 24 (citing

12

4AC ¶ 171). But these allegations do not give rise to an inference that Defendants would refuse to

13

hire older workers if they did apply, much less that Defendants would do so because of their age.

14

Indeed, the 4AC contains few allegations pertaining to Defendants’ hiring decisions, as opposed to

15

the advertising practices. To be sure, a discriminatory recruiting policy could lead to or be a part

16

of a discriminatory hiring policy; however, Plaintiffs have not made such allegations.

17

In addition, the Court is not convinced that Plaintiffs have stated a claim under the Unruh

18

Act (Count 9). Defendants argue that “the Act does not reach employment advertising or hiring,”

19

Mot. at 13; see also id. at 25, and the Court believes they are likely correct. The Unruh Act

20

guarantees “full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all

21

business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” Cal. Civ. Code. § 51(b). Interpreting the

22

phrase “business establishments,” the California Supreme Court has held that “the Act does not

23

cover ‘the employer-employee relationship.’” Alch v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 4th 339, 391

24

(2004) (quoting Isbister v. Boys’ Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 72, 83 n.12 (1985)). That is,

25

the Unruh Act forbids only discriminations by “made by a ‘business establishment’ in the course

26

of furnishing goods, services or facilities to its clients, patrons or customers,” which does not

27

include employment discrimination. Alcorn v. Anbro Eng’g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 500 (1970). In

28

the Court’s view, Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation that information about Defendants’ employment
31
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1

opportunities are among Defendants’ “goods, services or facilities,” 4AC ¶ 235, is not plausible.

2

Though Plaintiffs are applicants rather than literal employees, their claims appear to relate to the

3

employer-employee relationship rather than to, say the online goods that Amazon sells or the

4

wireless services that T-Mobile offers. Thus, the Court does not believe Plaintiffs have shown that

5

they are “in a relationship with [Defendants] similar to that of the customer in the customer-

6

proprietor relationship,” Strother v. S. California Permanente Med. Grp., 79 F.3d 859, 874 (9th

7

Cir. 1996), as opposed to that of the employee in the employer-employee relationship.
None of the foregoing should be considered the Court’s complete or final views on the

8
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9

sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ claims. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs are advised to remedy these likely

10

problems in preparing the 5AC.

11

IV.

12

ORDER
For the above reasons, the 4AC is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND and the

13

request for jurisdictional discovery is GRANTED. The parties shall develop a discovery plan and

14

propose a deadline for Plaintiffs to file the 5AC. Their proposed schedule shall be filed by March

15

20, 2020. When the 5AC is filed, Plaintiffs are directed to include a redlined complaint as an

16

attachment to the 5AC.

17
18

IT IS SO ORDERED.

19
20
21
22

Dated: March 13, 2020
______________________________________
BETH LABSON FREEMAN
United States District Judge

23
24
25
26
27
28
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